
# Buying Drugs for Science: Understanding the Economics of Cybercrime

# Stefan Savage Center for Evidence-based Security Research UC San Diego

**joint work w**/Neha Chachra, Brandon Enright, Mark Felegyhazi (ICSI), Chris Grier (Berkeley), Tristan Halvorson, Chris Kanich, Christian Kreibich (ICSI), Kirill Levchenko, He "Lonnie" Liu, Justin Ma, Damon McCoy, Vern Paxson (ICSI/Berkeley), Andreas Pitsillidis, Geoff Voelker, and Nick Weaver (ICSI)


### Alan Turing Memorial Scholarship

- Named for Alan Turing –
   father of computing
- Recognizes support for LGBT diversity efforts by students in CS & CE
- Working to raise \$50k to endow this scholarship
- More info at: cns.ucsd.edu



2017 recipient Tee Srey

# The traditional view of security...





### A complementary viewpoint

There is a broader socio-economic context




- Actors
  - Adversaries
  - Victims
  - Defenders
- Incentives/Costs
- Capabilities
- Relationships

- Key hypothesis:
  - Understanding these factors will provide a more effective basis for designing security interventions

#### Economics of e-crime

- Today, the largest driver for threats is \$\$\$
  - Scale allows commodity monetization



### Today: Advertising-based e-crime

- Range of abuse vectors to reach consumer
  - E-mail spam, SEO, OSN abuse, blog spam, malware
- Range of products/services advertised
  - Pharma, replica luxury goods, apparel and electronics, pirated movies, music, books and software, diplomas, dating, porn, gambling
  - FakeAV
- Almost all use an affiliate marketing structure
- Key point: monetized directly by consumers




### Affiliate program structure

- Division of labor
  - Affiliates handle advertising (e.g., spam, SEO)
    - Independent contractors
    - Paid 25-60% commission depending on program
  - Affiliate programs handle backend
    - Payment processing, customer service, fulfillment
    - Sometimes hosting and domain registration
- Why?
  - Transfer of risk: innovation risk vs investment risk
  - Specialization lowers cost structure

### One such example: Pharmaceutical e-mail spam

Complex value chain relationships






# A quick look inside a criminal pharmaceutical business

- Case study: Glavmed/Spamit, Rx-Promotion
  - 185M in gross revenue, 1+ million customers, 1.5+ million purchases, 2600+ affiliates
  - 75% of customers from US, 91% from West


Program	Period	Affiliates	Customers	Billed orders	Revenue
GlavMed	Jan 2007 – Apr 2010	1,759	584,199	699,516	\$81M
SpamIt	Jun 2007 – Apr 2010	484	535,365	704,169	\$92м
RX-Promotion	Oct 2009 – Dec 2010	415	59,769 – 69,446	71,294	\$12M



### Product purchase demographics



ED produces make up ~75% of orders and ~80% of revenue for GlavMed/SpamIt



#### Demand drivers

- Embarrassment/Taboo (80+% revenue is ED)
  - "Lifestyle" drugs (some ED, hair loss, diet, acne)

Spam filtering doesn't stop demand


20-40% of all sales come from the Spam folder

- Lack of regitimate market
  - Male enhancement, weird formulations (VSF)

# New customers over time (why spamming works)



#### Affiliates Revenue



# Business model (for affiliate program)

- Brilliant business model, risk transference
  - Advertising liabilities and innovation cost -> advertisers
  - Low switching cost on both sides
- Rough cost structure
  - Direct costs ( $\sim$ 70-75%) + 10% Holdback risk
    - C: Commissions to advertisers ( $\sim 0.30\text{-}0.45$ )
    - S: Supply cost (~0.15-20; **dominated by shipping**, goods~6-7%)
    - P: Payment processing overhead (~0.10-0.15; 3-5% refund)
  - Indirect costs (~6-12%)
- Gross margins =  $\sim 10-20\%$



# Affiliate program cost structure concrete example: RX-Promotion

RX-Promotion March – September 2010

Direct costs: 70.8%


Indirect costs: 12.8%

Profit: 16.3%

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Gross revenue	\$7.8M	
Direct costs	\$5.5M	(70.8%)
Commissions	\$3M	(38.1%)
Suppliers <sup>a</sup>	\$1.4M	(17.6%)
Processing	\$1M	(13.2%)
Other direct	\$148.3K	(1.9%)
Indirect costs	\$1004K	(12.8%)
Administrative	\$197K	(2.5%)
Customer service	\$124K	(1.6%)
Fines	\$107K	(1.4%)
IT expenses	\$202K	(2.6%)
<b>Domains</b>	\$114K	(1.5%)
Servers, hosting	\$66K	(0.8%)
Selling expenses	\$315K	(4%)
Marketing	\$105K	(1.3%)
Lobbying	\$157K	(2%)
Other indirect	\$134K	(1.7%)
Net revenue	\$1.3M	(16.3%)



### Where to intervene?






### Click Trajectory project

- Key idea
  - Find "bottlenecks" in the full spam value chain
  - Place where intervention could be most effective
    - Eliminating resources has largest impact on profitability
    - Fewest alternatives, highest switching cost for adversary
- Measure empirically
  - Resources needed to monetize each piece of spam
  - By playing the role of customer; at scale
    - Three domains: pharma, replica, software






- Click Trajectories study [Levchenko, IEEE S&P 2011]
- Goal: identify key bottlenecks in spam value chain

- 7 URL/Spam feeds + 5 botnet feeds
  - 968M URLs, 17M domains
  - 99% of pharma, OEM, replica
- Crawled domains for 98% of URLs
- Hundreds of purchases
  - Unique card # per order
  - Full transaction data

## What is gained by purchasing?

- Insight into realization phase
  - Fulfillment
    - Receiving anything?
    - Where shipped from?
    - Contents of order?
  - Payment info (via relationship with card issuers)
    - Bank Identification Number (BIN) of acquiring bank
    - Merchant descriptor
    - Card Acceptor ID (CAID) (MID + TID)
    - Merchant Category Code (MCC)




















### 600+ orders later...





### Aside: not a fraud game


- We've made many hundreds of orders now
  - Pharma, herbal, replica, software, fakeAV
  - Shipment for all but one
  - Basically no fraud losses on cards (exceptions: data breach of Glavmed, 1 FakeAV)
- Significant reorder business (~30%)
  - Need to keep customers happy
- Affiliate programs generally *believe* they are selling reasonable quality goods

#### The bad news

- Most resources are cheap and plentiful
  - Registrars, name servers, Web hosting
- Replacement cost < expected profit</p>
  - Examined blacklisting, filtering, takedown, etc... all have *little revenue impact*
  - May protect customers, but doesn't undermine business model
- One major exception...



### Merchant banks (circa 2010)



- 3 banks covered 95% of spam
- Fewer banks willing handle "high-risk" merchants
- High switching cost
  - In-person account creation, due diligence, multi-day process
  - Upfront capital, holdback forfeiture




### Hypothesis

- If we could target merchant accounts...
  - Could demonetize entire system
  - Asymmetry that favors the good guys!



## Anecdotal evidence: Revenue by drug type (RX-Promo)



### A brief tech transfer story





The IACC

Membership

**Initiatives** 

**Training & Partners** 

Conferences

Counterfeiting

Resources

Contact

**ROGUEBLOCK INITIATIVE** 

ROGUEBLOCK MEMBER LOGIN

**REQUEST MORE INFO** 

IACC PAYMENT PROCESSOR INITIATIVE (RogueBlock®)



IACC RogueBlock® Initiative

The Payment Processor Initiative (RogueBlock®) is a collaborative effort of the IACC and the payment industry to create a streamlined, simplified procedure for members to report online sellers of counterfeit or pirated goods directly to credit card and payment processing networks.

With a goal of facilitating prompt action against counterfeiters' merchant accounts and diminishing the ability of such sellers to profit from their illicit sales, the Payment Processor Initiative (RogueBlock®)

# Result: targeted payment intervention efforts today

- Undercover test purchase at counterfeit site
  - Get merchant bank BIN from transaction
- IP holder notifies card network (e.g., Visa/MC)
  - Investigation; complaint delivered to merchant bank
- Leverage via card association contract
  - Merchant bank owns liability
  - Fines, increased scrutiny, de-association
- Merchant account shutdown

#### So... does it work?

- Bottom line: Yes, amazingly well.
- We've tracked bank association w/affiliate programs for almost two years (continuing...)
  - ~1000 purchases (Visa only)
- Joined programs as affiliates to get damage assessment from inside
- Quick stories: OEM software and Pharma



# Example: OEM (pirate) software







ПРИВАТНАЯ **ОЕМ**-ПАРТНЁРКА — **СИЛА!**БОЛНЫСКИЙ НЭНЭКЛОП!



















# **OEM** software story

- Microsoft Thanksgiving surprise (Nov '11)
  - Methodically issued complaints for accounts of every major affiliate program



### Qualitative Timeline

11/2011: Major software brand holder starts test purchases and merchant account complaints





1/23/2012 Remark by leading affiliate:

"The sun is setting on the OEM




# **OEM** software story

- As of mid-late 2013
  - OEM software market was decimated
  - 90% of programs folded
    - Remaining programs stopped selling Microsoft software
    - MS lacked standing to issue complaint
  - Single operation effective for 18 months
- Similar story in pharma market
  - Albeit with less focus than software



### Medinc.biz



#### Glavmed



6/29/2012



Dear Partners,



Регистрация: 23-05-2007

our rundis,

As you may have noticed, in the last couple of days we've had problems with processing. We don't have a solution yet, and there is no concrete time when it will be resolved.

. . . . . . .

From this point forward, GlavMed is switching to a "PAUSED" mode. No new orders will be processed until the processing issue is resolved.

We urge you to temporarily switch your traffic to other shops/projects.

Новость, конечно, неприятная, но не смертельная. Поэтому прошу не разводить панику, а обсуждать возникающие вопросы по существу.


ГлавМед - Фармовый динозавр. Не быстрый, но, сука, надежный! http://www.glavmed.com 

Теперь ОНО еще и разговаривает



✓ Запомнить: Поэтому с настоящего будут выполнены, как и ет больше ясности и велика, но в любом рашаться ко мне

### **OxoPharm**






#### Cashadmin

CASH (S) ADMIN ■ To all Cashadmin affiliates, .... RX industry is under attack from all sides. Recently, we have lost our credit card processing abilities several times, and it has come to the point where we are losing more money processing orders than we are getting from the orders themselves. The industry has become impossible to manage and maintain. Cashadmin has closed its sites...

# Life is tough all around...



"Right now most affiliate programs have a mass of declines, cancels and pendings, and it doesn't depend much on the program imho, there is a general sad picture, fucking Visa is burning us with napalm (for problematic countries, it's totally fucked, on a couple of programs you're lucky if you get 50% through)."




### Summary

- Security is about more than just technology
  - Effective intervention requires reasoning about the economic/social structure of our adversaries
- There is an achievable research agenda here
  - Much more than I was able to talk about today
    - Not only spam: malware distribution, account abuse, ad abuse, financial credentials theft, advanced fee fraud, etc
  - Opportunities for meaningful impact



### Alan Turing Memorial Scholarship

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2017 recipient Tee Srey

